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WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK 
ABOUT CONTROL? 
Anthony J. Sebok* 
INTRODUCTION 
Litigation investment, or champerty, is the maintenance of a stranger’s 
lawsuit for profit.1  Litigation investment is expanding in the United States, 
and as it expands, the controversy surrounding it grows.2  Litigation 
investment occurs when nonlawyers invest for profit in litigation in which 
they otherwise have no interest.3  For purposes of this Article, litigation is 
the expenditure of money by a party to enforce (or defend) an existing or 
anticipated legal claim, where the money is used either to purchase the 
services of an attorney in anticipation of an appearance before, or 
submission of materials to, an adjudicative body.4  In the last quarter of the 
twentieth century various critics emerged who argued that the American 
system of litigation was in need of reform, in part because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys had started to view litigation as an investment, which resulted in a 
marked increase in frivolous and/or socially unproductive litigation.5  
 
*  Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  The author served as Academic Co-
Reporter to the American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Ethics 20/20 Working 
Group on Alternative Litigation Finance and has consulted for Burford, a litigation funding 
firm.  None of the views in this Article are necessarily those of the ABA or Burford. 
 1. Litigation investment is champerty.  “‘[C]hamperty is maintaining a suit in return for 
a financial interest in the outcome . . . .’” Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 
269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)).  For review of 
the history and current state of the law of champerty, see Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic 
Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors Share in the 
Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1; Richard A. Epstein et al., Room for Debate, 
Investing in Someone Else’s Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit. 
 3. For an excellent review, see STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING 
IN THE UNITED STATES:  ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS (2010); MAX VOLSKY, INVESTING 
IN JUSTICE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL FINANCE, LAWSUIT ADVANCES AND LITIGATION 
FUNDING 24–25 (2013). 
 4. A broader definition of litigation might include all legal dispute resolution, including 
informal negotiation over disputed legal claims.  Any investment of time and money, even 
by a layperson—such as the drafting of a demand letter to a debtor by a creditor—could, in 
theory, count as litigation. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We 
Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and 
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 11–18 (1983) (discussing the “construction of 
disputes” in society).  The definition used in this Article is narrower. 
 5. See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not To Fund:  The Need for Second-Best Solutions to 
the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 630 (2012) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ 
bar has strong monetary incentives to create liability through repeated litigation of presently 
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Litigation investment is now the object of a similar sort of critique based on 
the fear that litigation will be subject to a new round of commercialization.6 
One of the leading arguments against litigation investment is that it will 
interfere with the relationship between the party who has the claim and her 
lawyer.7  The Institute for Legal Reform has argued that litigation 
investment “undercuts plaintiff and lawyer control over litigation because 
the [litigation investment] company, as an investor in the plaintiff’s lawsuit, 
presumably will seek to protect its investment, and can therefore be 
expected to try to exert control over the plaintiff’s and counsel’s strategic 
decisions.”8  This concern is echoed by those worried that an attorney may 
not be able to fulfill her ethical obligations if her client signs a litigation 
investment contract.  For example, the Professional Ethics Commission of 
the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, like most ethics committees asked 
for their opinion, said 
[W]hile we cannot say that it is per se unethical for a lawyer to assist a 
client in obtaining personal injury lawsuit advances, we do find that the 
above scenario raises a number of potential ethical problems that should 
be of concern to the lawyer. . . .  [T]he lawyer must guard against any risk 
that the financing company will attempt to control the litigation or 
otherwise interfere with the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment.9 
 
non-meritorious claims.”). See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (discussing tort reform and the attack on the entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs’ bar).  Nora Engstrom gives a very different evaluation of the entrepreneurial 
plaintiffs’ bar, arguing that the “settlement mills,” operated by lawyers with an 
“entrepreneurial (rather than professional) orientation,” serve a valuable social function. 
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 819 (2011). 
 6. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING 
TROUBLE:  THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2009), available at 
http://ilr.iwssites.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (arguing that litigation 
investment funders “‘have no interest in the justice . . . only in the chances of success—as 
they will demand a share of the damages awarded in return for putting up the stake money’” 
(quoting Joshua Hamerman, Hedge Funds:  A Litigious Bunch, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., 
Dec. 17, 2007, at 9)); Kidd, supra note 5, at 630–31; Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus 
Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 593 (2012); Roger 
Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (June 28, 2011, 2:06 PM), 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/. 
 7. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 6, at 15 (explaining 
that third-party funding thus “places the power to make strategic decisions about the case in 
the hands of the funder”). 
 8. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS:  A 
PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf.  As one 
commentator has stated, “A primary concern with litigation funding is the potential for 
litigation funding companies to direct or regulate the professional judgment of the attorneys 
with whom they deal in order to protect the companies’ investments.  In so doing, the 
companies may impair the attorney’s representation of his client.” Douglas R. Richmond, 
Other People’s Money:  The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 669 
(2005). 
 9. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 191 (2006), available at 
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=87348; see State Bar of 
Mich., Op. RI-321 (2000), available at https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_
opinions/ri-321.cfm; Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding:  Charting a Legal and 
Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 650 (2007) (noting that litigation investment contracts 
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The Ethics Committee of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section 
of the New York State Bar Association cautioned in its report that litigation 
investment “arguably creates a tension between the [third-party litigation 
financing] investor’s interest in instructing, or even mandating, that the 
party make certain strategic decisions that best serve the investor’s goals, 
and the party’s or lawyer for the party’s exercise of independent 
judgment.”10  The American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Ethics 
20/20 and the New York City Bar Association were not as concerned over 
the risk that litigation investment would interfere with an attorney’s 
exercise of independent judgment or loyalty.11  The New York City Bar 
opinion even suggested that, consistent with obtaining consent from the 
client under New York Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b)(4), a litigation 
investor may “influence [a lawyer’s] professional judgment in determining 
the course or strategy of the litigation, including the decisions of whether to 
settle or the amount to accept in any settlement.”12 
These concerns have worked their way into the legal regulation of 
litigation investment.  Litigation investment is allowed in only 
approximately one-half of U.S. jurisdictions.13  Many courts have held that 
the common law still requires some supervision of litigation investment 
contracts (although under what basis is not clear, since many of these courts 
have also rejected common law champerty).14  Virtually all jurisdictions 
that allow it, however, restrict the degree of control that strangers can 
exercise over the litigation.15  Usually, an investor’s power to control the 
 
“threaten to undermine the duty of loyalty owed to a client by creating a contractual 
relationship with a third party”). 
 10. ETHICS COMM. OF THE COMMERCIAL & FED. LITIG. SECTION OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 10 
(2013), available at http://www.benthamimf.com/docs/default-document-library/nys-bar---
opinion-of-ethical-implications-04-16-13.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (emphasis added). 
 11. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 
(2011), available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-
formal-opinion-2011-02; see also AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, 
INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 22–23 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_
20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 12. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 
(“While a client may agree to permit a financing company to direct the strategy or other 
aspects of a lawsuit, absent client consent, a lawyer may not permit the company to influence 
his or her professional judgment in determining the course or strategy of the litigation, 
including the decisions of whether to settle or the amount to accept in any settlement.”). 
 13. See Sebok, supra note 1, at 98–99 n.162 (providing a state-by-state review). 
 14. See, e.g., Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (finding that 
although champerty was no longer recognized in Massachusetts, courts still had inherent 
power to scrutinize agreements); Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 12–13 (Or. 1891) (same). 
 15. See, e.g., Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that 
an alleged champertor was not an officious intermeddler when, among other things, she did 
not impose her views on the attorneys or litigants); L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Prof’l 
Responsibility and Ethics Comm., Op. No. 500 (1999), available at http://www.lacba.org/
showpage.cfm?pageid=433 (citing Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878–79 (Ct. App. 
1991)) (finding agreement invalid if it was “tainted by outside pressures”). 
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litigation is reduced to zero by reference to the lawyer’s ethical obligation 
not to participate in a case where their client has ceded too much control.16 
This Article takes up two questions.  First, whether the professional 
independence protected by the restrictions on litigation investment is 
similar to the professional independence protected by Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.4 and its various state equivalents.17  I argue that 
the doctrines constraining both litigation investment and fee splitting with 
nonlawyers sweep too broadly when they prevent lay persons from buying 
an interest in litigation, and that the threat of interference with lawyers’ 
professional independence is, in both cases, overblown.  Second, I argue 
that the current insurance law doctrines concerning third-party liability 
insurance require litigants to give up much of the control that the doctrines 
constraining litigation investment and fee splitting with nonlawyers are 
designed to keep out of the hands of lay investors. 
I.  THE PROHIBITION ON FEE SPLITTING AND ITS RATIONALE 
In this section, I review the prohibition on fee splitting itself and the 
rationale that is often cited in its support, the preservation of attorneys 
independent professional judgment. 
A.  Fee Splitting 
Under the Model Rules, fee splitting with a nonlawyer is forbidden.  
Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 5.04(a) is typical:  “A 
lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise to share legal fees with a 
nonlawyer [with exceptions not relevant here].”18  Historically the core 
concern of the fee-splitting rule is the impermissible solicitation of clients.19  
Other and more modern rationales for the prohibition on fee splitting with 
nonlawyers are the minimization of the risk of the unauthorized practice of 
law, and, most important for our purposes, protecting the independent 
judgment of the lawyer.20 
In contrast, the District of Columbia permits a nonlawyer to receive a 
portion of a fee received by a lawyer when the nonlawyer and the lawyer 
 
 16. See, e.g., Prof’l Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 00-3 (2002), available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBETOpin.nsf/840090c16eedaf0085256b61000928dc/f40a5
4f76a7da5a585256b800057b541?OpenDocument (“The attorney also shall not allow the 
funding company to direct the litigation, interfere with the attorney-client relationship, or 
otherwise influence the attorney’s independent professional judgment.”). 
 17. Excluding, of course, D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4, which will be 
discussed separately. See infra notes 21–23. 
 18. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.04(a). 
 19. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 16.5.5, at 911–12 (1986). 
 20. “The provisions of Rule 5.04(a) express traditional limitations on sharing legal fees 
with nonlawyers.  The principal reasons for these limitations are to prevent solicitation by 
lay persons of clients for lawyers and to avoid encouraging or assisting nonlawyers in the 
practice of law.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.04 cmt. 1.  “A person 
entitled to share a lawyer’s fees is likely to attempt to influence the lawyer’s activities so as 
to maximize those fees.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 10 cmt. b (2000). 
2014] WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CONTROL 2943 
form a “joint venture organization.”21  D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 
5.4 provides that, subject to certain limitations, “[a] lawyer may practice 
law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial 
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual 
nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the organization 
in providing legal services to clients.”22  The lawyer and the nonlawyer may 
divide the earnings of the partnership as they see fit.23 
1.  Fee Splitting in a Model Rules Jurisdiction 
Conventional wisdom is that it simply is not possible under the Model 
Rules for a lawyer to give any part of her fees in exchange for money or 
time invested by a layperson in a case.24  The conventional wisdom is based 
on a distinction drawn by the Model Rules between a financial 
arrangement, in which a nonlawyer’s profit or loss is directly related to the 
successfulness of a lawyer’s legal business, and a loan, in which both the 
occurrence and amount of repayment does not depend on the lawyer’s skills 
and efforts.25  According to this analysis, the repayment of debt with funds 
that come from fees is not the sharing of fees because the lender’s profit is 
not directly related to the size of the contingent fee received by the lawyer.  
For example, suppose Lawyer establishes a revolving line of credit with 
Bank, which requires Lawyer to pay interest at 10 percent.26  Obviously, the 
revenue used by Lawyer to pay Bank can come from nothing other than 
fees, unless Lawyer or his firm has property that is producing income (such 
as the building in which the law firm sits) or Lawyer has personal assets 
derived from some independent source of income or property that Lawyer 
uses to secure the loan.  It is obvious, therefore, that in the vast majority of 
loans to lawyers, all payments to creditors constitute, in a literal sense, a 
sharing of attorney’s fees with nonlawyers.  Nevertheless, it is well 
established that interest payments to a commercial lender do not violate the 
 
 21. D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
legal-ethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§ 45.4 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (“[T]he phrase ‘shall not share legal fees’ [in Rule 5.4(a)] is 
intended to bar any financial arrangement in which a nonlawyer’s profit or loss is directly 
related to the successfulness of a lawyer’s legal business.”). 
 25. Id.; see WOLFRAM, supra note 19, § 16.3. 
 26. This well-known example is drawn from 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 45.4 
illus. 45-1. 
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fee-splitting rule.27  If Bank goes further and acquires a security interest in 
Lawyer’s accounts receivables, the fee-splitting rule is still not violated.28 
Even within the allegedly safe terrain of lending, there are still 
disagreements over many subsidiary issues.  First, while it is somewhat 
settled that the lawyer may pass onto the client loan-related costs (e.g., 
interest) like any other litigation-related expense, even this rule has its 
critics.29  Second, while it appears that the better rule is that a lawyer may 
not use the client’s recovery as collateral for the loan, even if the loan is 
being used for the client’s benefit and even if the client consents to such an 
arrangement, at least one jurisdiction, Maine, suggests that with client 
consent the lender can take a lien in the total recovery.30  Third, many but 
not all jurisdictions hold that the mere fact that that the loan is nonrecourse 
(that is, the obligation to repay is triggered only if there is a positive 
outcome in the case) does not make it a form of fee splitting.31  This last 
point illuminates the ambiguity at the heart of the fee-splitting prohibition.  
Is it the sharing of the lawyer’s fee that brings a “loan” within the 
prohibition or the contingency of repayment that makes the loan 
impermissible?32  The majority of bar committee opinions that have 
reviewed this question hold that the better view is that conditioning the 
repayment amount on the size of the lawyer’s fee turns a loan into fee 
 
 27. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Op. 92-9 (1993), available at http://www.isba.org/
sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/92-09.pdf (stating that establishing a “credit facility” to pay 
the lawyers’ fee, in return for 10 percent financing charge, does not violate Rule 5.4(a)); Or. 
State Bar, Formal Op. 2005-133 (2005), available at https://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/
2005-133.pdf (same); see also Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law:  
Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 608 (1989). 
 28. See, e.g., Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 152 (1995), 
available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=89759 
(permitting a law firm to open a line of credit with a bank, secured by the firm’s 
receivables); Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Litigation Finance Ethics:  
Paying Interest, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 16 (“State ethics committees generally now allow 
attorneys to borrow funds for litigation expenses as long as the financing agreements comply 
with each state’s rules of professional conduct.”). 
 29. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending:  Costs and Consequences, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286307. 
 30. Compare N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12 (2006), available at http://www.ncbar.com/
ethics/printopinion.asp?id=753 (“Lawyer may never put a client’s funds at risk to obtain a 
loan.”), and Kreder & Bauer, supra note 28, at 17, with Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Me. Bd. of 
Overseers of the Bar, Op. 177 (2001), available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/
attorney_services/opinion.html?id=89473 (“[T]he attorney may not allow the financing 
institution to acquire any lien or other security interest in the client’s claim without the 
informed consent of the client.” (emphasis added)). 
 31. Compare N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12, and Phila. Bar Ass’n, Op. No. 2003-15 
(2003), available at www.philadelphiabar.org/page/EthicsOpinion2003-15?appNum=1 
(permitting nonrecourse loans), with Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Me. Bd. of Overseers of 
the Bar, Op. 193 (2007), available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/
opinion.html?id=86896, and State Bar of Nev. Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 36 (2007), available at http://nvbar.org/sites/default/files/
opinion_36.pdf  (prohibiting nonrecourse loans). 
 32. For an example where both features were present and no distinction was drawn 
between them, see Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 576 (2006), available 
at https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/opinions/501-600/eo576.pdf. 
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splitting; conditioning repayment of a fixed amount to the success of a case 
is not fee splitting.33 
Why is repaying a loan (with funds that could only have come from fees) 
not fee splitting?  As Larry Ribstein has noted, the line between a loan and 
equity can be blurry, and it can be “gamed” by clever drafting.34  Ethics 
opinions are not very helpful in setting out either rationales or criteria to aid 
in applying the rule.  According to one, a “loan” in which the cost of the 
loan increased in lockstep with the success of the lawsuit supported by the 
loan was fee splitting because “[b]y tying the proposed funding fee to a 
percentage of the recovery, the lending company would be directly 
benefiting from the lawyer’s knowledge, skill, experience and time 
expended to the detriment of the lawyer, who would be solely responsible 
for paying the funding fee.”35  The distinction drawn here between a 
nonlawyer enjoying benefits “directly” linked to the lawyer’s knowledge, 
skill, experience, and time and a nonlawyer “indirectly” benefiting from the 
same suggests that the purpose of Rule 5.4(a) must be more than preventing 
a nonlawyer from having an equity stake in a lawyer’s professional license 
and the special privileges that come with it.36  Therefore, we should look to 
other applications of Rule 5.4(a) to nonloan transactions to see if they can 
cast a light on what is at stake. 
a.  Nonlawyer Agents Versus Nonlawyer Investors 
Numerous cases and ethics opinions consider the fee-splitting issue in the 
context of payments made by lawyers to independent contractors and 
employees.37  Paying bonuses or contingent fees to experts is ordinarily 
permissible but may violate the fee-splitting rule if the payment is 
computed as a percentage of the attorney’s fee received in a particular 
 
 33. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12; Phila. Bar Ass’n, Op. No. 2003-15. At least one 
reported decision discloses the existence of a nonrecourse loan to a law firm where the 
repayment amount was a function of the case recovery of the law firm’s client. See Lawsuit 
Funding, LLC v. Lessoff, No. 650757/2012, 2013 WL 6409971, at *5–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
4, 2013). 
 34. Ribstein noted that the firm McKee Nelson Ernst & Young in the District of 
Columbia was an example of the uncertainty between debt and equity in law firm financing.  
The firm was capitalized with a nonrecourse loan from an accounting firm accompanied by 
certain repayment obligations that may have crossed “the subtle line into ‘equity,’” thus 
violating the ethics rules “in all 50 states” and possibly even the D.C. rule. Larry E. Ribstein, 
Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161, 1173 
(2001). 
 35. Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 576. 
 36. “Thus, it cannot be that nonlawyer ownership is just about money and financial 
structuring of law firms.  Rather, it is the concept of allowing nonlawyers to exercise 
‘ownership’ over a legal practice that lies at the heart of this debate.” N.Y. STATE BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP 71 (2012), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26682. 
 37. See Patterson v. Law Office of Lauri J. Goldstein, P.A., 980 So. 2d 1234, 1234 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Atkins v. Tinning, 865 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App. 1993); see also 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.04 cmt. 1; D.C. Bar, Op. 322 (2004), 
available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm. 
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matter.38  A similar line of authority relates to the payment of bonuses to 
nonlawyer employees of law firms.  While Model Rule 5.4(a)(3) is an 
express exception to the fee-splitting rule, permitting the compensation of 
nonlawyer employees on a profit-sharing basis, some cases and ethics 
opinions state that the amount of compensation may not be tied to or 
contingent upon the firm’s receipt of a fee from a particular matter.39 
Ethics opinions barring fee splitting with nonlawyer agents emphasize 
that there is an ineliminable risk that, when an agent’s earnings are 
contingent on the outcome of a case on which he works, he may act against 
the client’s interests by (1) deciding where to invest time and other 
resources among multiple clients based on which case promises the greatest 
reward, or (2) “steering” new clients to the lawyer even though they 
otherwise would be better served by going to a different lawyer.40 
These risks are not present—or are not present in the same way—in the 
case of a nonlawyer investor.  The incentive for an agent to self-deal is 
different than for an investor—passive or active—to use whatever leverage 
she may have to maximize the value of her equity stake.  First, although 
much of the controversy surrounding reforming Rule 5.4(a), from the Kutak 
Commission to the most recent efforts led by the ABA’s Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 Alternative Law Practice Structures (ALPS) Working Group, 
focused on nonlawyers as either employers or partners, it is far more likely 
that nonlawyer ownership will take the form of investment capital.41  
Investors are less likely to take steps to cause lawyers to commit 
malpractice or to degrade the reputational capital of the firm.  As Edward 
 
 38. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich., Op. RI-104 (1991), available at 
http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-104.cfm (finding that it was 
permissible to pay a contingent fee to tax expert, but the fee could not be calculated as a 
percentage of the tax savings realized by the client because that would violate the fee-
splitting rule); accord Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Informal Op. No. 93-164 (1993), available at 1993 WL 851259. 
 39. See, e.g., Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1154–55 (Ind. 1997); In re 
Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 367 S.E.2d 17, 17–18 (S.C. 1988); State Bar v. 
Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Tex. App. 1991); Prof’l Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 02-1 
(2002), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin.nsf/SearchView/ETHICS,+
OPINION+02-1?opendocument; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 
887 (2011), available at http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/
Opinions826900/EO_887.pdf; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 
733 (2000), available at http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/
Opinions676750/EO_733.pdf (stating that a nonlawyer marketer may receive a bonus based 
on the firm’s overall profits but not on particular matters referred to the firm as the result of 
the marketer’s efforts); N.C. State Bar, RPC Op. 147 (1993), available at 
http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/printopinion.asp?id=147; Phila. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2004-3 (2004), 
available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/EthicsOpinion2004-3?appNum=3. 
 40. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.04 cmt. 1; D.C. Bar, 
Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/
opinion322.cfm. 
 41. The debate over the Kutak Commission’s recommendations was captured by the 
following possibility offered by its critics:  what if a large consumer retail store (like Sears) 
began to hire lawyers and paralegals and offered legal services in the store. 2 HAZARD & 
HODES, supra note 24, § 45.3; Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement:  The 
Problem of Non-lawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 608–
10 (1994) (describing problems with nonlawyer partners in a multidisciplinary partnership). 
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Adams and John Matheson have pointed out, “nonlawyer-controlled law 
firms, which could take the form of private entities with nonlawyer 
ownership or publicly traded corporations, would be in the business of 
providing legal services and would succeed only by providing sound legal 
judgment to consumers, as is the case now.”42  Further, if the investor is 
investing in the lawyer’s net profits, and not individual cases, then the 
investor faces the same malpractice risk as the lawyer.  If the lawyer 
accedes to investor’s demands to recommend to the client an action in 
violation of her professional responsibilities, the lawyer’s malpractice risk 
will be reflected in lower net profits, which will reduce the investor’s return 
on her investment.43 
Finally, the risk that nonlawyer investors might “steer” clients to lawyers 
inappropriate for their needs was one of the main rationales for the 
Professional Ethics Commission for the State Bar of Texas Opinion Nos. 
467 and 576.44  The risk, as stated, seems far-fetched in general (a lawyer’s 
landlord is not often in the position to refer clients), and in the case of 
investment by hedge funds or shareholders, it seems especially far-fetched:  
investors in a contingent fee firm are not in a better position than the firm to 
identify and persuade potential clients to retain the firm; that is, an investor 
lacks what one would think is precisely the type of expertise that he wishes 
to purchase with his investment.45 
b.  Particular Matter Versus General Firm Revenue 
As noted in the section above, one of the reasons that ethics committees 
found fee splitting with nonlawyer agents of lawyers objectionable is that it 
 
 42. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?:  A Proposal 
for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) (“Indeed, if the 
stock of the firm were publicly traded, the value of a firm’s stock would directly reflect the 
market’s perception of the ability of the firm to render quality, professional legal services.  
To the extent that the law firm’s reputation is tarnished because it provides inadequate 
services, the stockholders stand to lose.”). 
 43. This prophylactic reflects the same incentive structure built into MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2013), which permits a firm that refers a case to another firm to 
share in the latter’s fees as long as it also shares the latter’s malpractice risk. 
 44. As the Commission noted in Opinion No. 576: 
The Committee reasoned [in Opinion No. 467] that a percentage rental agreement 
is prohibited for lawyers because an arrangement under which a nonlawyer 
landlord could receive a percentage of legal fees earned by a law firm would create 
an incentive for the landlord to refer legal business to the law firm, a result that 
Rule 5.04(a) is intended to prevent.  Similarly [in this case], the proposed 
arrangement here would create an incentive for the lending company to refer cases 
to lawyers using its services. 
Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 576 (2006), available at 
https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/opinions/501-600/eo576.pdf. 
 45. Some writers have suggested that investment in a firm’s profits could be restated as 
derivatives, which would create certain advantages, especially in terms of raising capital. See 
Bruce MacEwen, Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Larry Ribstein, Law Firms, Ethics, and Equity 
Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 76 (2008).  Proposals for law firms to raise capital 
through stock offerings would seem simply impossible in a Model Rules jurisdiction. Erin J. 
Cox, Comment, An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing To Waste:  Reforming the Business 
of Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REV. 511, 526 (2009). 
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occurred in a piecemeal fashion.  If, on the other hand, compensation is tied 
to general firm revenue, the fee-splitting rule is not violated.46  As one bar 
committee put it, the Model Rules “generally stand for the proposition that 
paying a percentage of firm net profits to nonlawyer employees is 
permissible, whereas paying a percentage of a fee in an identifiable case or 
series of cases is not.”47  The distinction drawn between firm receivables or 
revenue, which is comprised of a pool of fees received by the firm, and the 
fees received in a specific case, like the distinction between loan and equity, 
is one of the clues that will help us understand the rationale behind Rule 
5.4(a). 
A handful of opinions deny that there is a difference between the revenue 
from a single case, a set of cases, or a firm’s general revenue of 
profitability.  In Texas, a bar committee held that a lawyer could not pay his 
landlord rent that increased (or decreased) depending on his firm’s “gross 
receipts” because the contract would violate Texas Rule 5.04(a).48  Even 
more directly in tension with the proposition that a lawyer may pay an 
investor a portion of his firm’s net profits is a decision by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court that involved an investor who sought to invest in a lawyer’s 
future “products liability litigation.”49  The court upheld the ruling of a 
disciplinary action against a lawyer in an unrelated matter but endorsed the 
conclusion that the investment was fee splitting.50  The Wisconsin case 
might be distinguishable from the investment analyzed in D.C. Opinion No. 
322 in one regard:  the investor in the former case was investing in a 
defined class of cases (products liability) while the nonlawyer in the latter 
case was receiving compensation based on the lawyer’s firm’s net profits.  
The Texas case can only be explained as either an outlier or a mistake. 
2.  Fee Splitting in D.C. 
Since 1990 the District of Columbia has permitted nonlawyers to form 
law partnerships with lawyers.51  This is a form of nonlawyer investment, 
although it was designed to accommodate the demands by other 
professionals such as accountants and financial planners to form 
partnerships with lawyers.52  Firms that partner with professionals from 
other disciplines do not typically bill their clients through contingent fee 
agreements, although nothing in the language of Rule 5.4(b) prevents the 
 
 46. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich., Op. RI-143 (1992), available at 
https://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-143.cfm. 
 47. D.C. Bar, Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-
ethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm (emphasis added). 
 48. Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 467 (1990), available at 
https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/Opinions/401-500/O467.html. 
 49. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Van Cura, 504 N.W.2d 610, 610 (Wis. 
1993). 
 50. See id. at 611–12. 
 51. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b). 
 52. Id. R. 5.4 cmt. 3 & 4. 
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splitting of a contingent fee with a nonlawyer partner.53  In the words of one 
commentator, Rule 5.4(b) has “fairly stringent conditions that few firms 
have thought it worth satisfying.”54  Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes 
state that Rule 5.4(b) requires the investor to be active in the law firm 
formed with the lawyer—in other words, “the nonlawyers must actively 
assist the lawyers who provide legal services.”55  In addition, the active 
involvement by the nonlawyer must satisfy the test of “ancillary services,” 
which means a service “directly linked to the legal services being provided 
to the client.”56 
B.  Control of a Lawyer by a Nonlawyer Investor 
The Model Rules are designed to preserve the independence of a 
lawyer’s professional judgment.  This is the clear purpose of Rules 1.8(f) 
and 5.4(c).  Rule 5.4(a) preserves a lawyer’s independent judgment by 
protecting her against control by nonlawyers.  “[F]ee splitting between 
lawyer and layman . . . poses the possibility of control by the layperson, 
interested in his own profit, rather than the client’s fate.”57  Fear of the 
control of lawyers by nonlawyers was one of the constant themes of critics 
of the Kutak Commission and the Ethics 20/20 ALPS Working Group.58  
This is not to deny, however, that other concerns were raised with equal 
fervor, including the fear that splitting fees with nonlawyers would weaken 
lawyer self-regulation and would ill serve clients by allowing client 
confidences to be discovered.59 
As Bruce Green has noted, professional independence can mean multiple 
things:  independence from clients, third parties, and the judiciary.60  
However, as he notes, Rule 5.4 is “essentially a conflict of interest rule” 
 
 53. See D.C. Bar, Op. 322 (2004), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
legal-ethics/opinions/opinion322.cfm. 
 54. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LEGAL ETHICS:  A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF LAWYERING IN 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 5.4:300 (David B. Isbell ed., 2007), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/dc/narr/DC_NARR_5.HTM#5.4:300. 
 55. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 45.6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95–392 (1995) (citation 
omitted); see also Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 193 (2007), 
available at http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=86896 (“The 
underlying rationale for [Maine’s] rule is that any fee sharing arrangement creates an 
unacceptable risk that the professional independence of the lawyer will be influenced by the 
non-lawyer who has an interest in the attorney’s fee.”). 
 58. During a debate over Kutak recommendations, a “delegate quipped that the proposed 
abolition of the prohibitions would be a ‘breach of the golden rule.  The one who has the 
gold makes the rules, and the one that has the gold under [then proposed] 5.4, is going to be 
a non-lawyer.’” Andrews, supra note 27, at 605–06. 
 59. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 36, at 67–77; Ted Schneyer, 
“Professionalism” As Pathology:  The ABA’s Latest Policy Debate on Nonlawyer 
Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 123–24 (2012). 
 60. See Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence:  Overrated or 
Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013). 
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designed to protect the client from third parties.61  As one critic of the 
liberalization of Rule 5.4(a) put it: 
 Lawyers have, among others, three core values built into our Codes of 
Professional Responsibility that the [reformers] want us to eliminate—our 
total independence from outside influence in the representation of our 
clients, our undivided loyalty toward our clients, and our obligation to 
maintain their confidences and secrets. . . .  How can lawyers function for 
their clients when their independence and loyalty are necessarily to be 
divided between their responsibilities to clients and their responsibilities 
to their [nonlawyer] partners or employers?62 
The concern for clients expressed here is threefold:  (1) that they receive 
advice that has not been influenced by third parties; (2) that their ends are 
placed above all others (loyalty); and (3) that their confidences be 
maintained.  The question of maintaining confidences is an important one, 
but existing rules of professional responsibility and evidence may be 
sufficient to answer it, and in any event, this question is outside the scope of 
this Article.63  The first and second concerns are closely connected to the 
concerns raised by the bar committee interpretations of Rule 5.4(a) above 
and are the concern of this Article. 
1.  Loyalty 
Like “professional independence,” loyalty can mean multiple things in 
legal ethics.64  It can mean the technical obligations set out in the Model 
Rules, which Eli Wald described as a “floor,” or the slightly more 
demanding fiduciary-like obligations set out in the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers, or the aspiration of zealous advocacy and 
“warm zeal” suggested by case law and some commentators.65  At a 
minimum, the lawyer is an agent of the client, and her primary task is to 
“promot[e] the objectives of the client” within the limits of the law.66 
Rule 5.4 is clearly designed to strengthen client loyalty.67  Critics of 
nonlawyer investment have argued that loyalty to clients will be 
compromised by demands of investors to cut expenses or divert resources to 
cases on the basis of their potential return to the law firm and not based on 
the needs of the firm’s clients.68  Critics have also pointed to the possibility 
 
 61. Id. at 616. 
 62. Robert L. Ostertag, Multidisciplinary Practice:  Our Profession Is Not for Sale, 
ABA GPSOLO, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 22, 27–28. 
 63. See, e.g., Adams & Matheson, supra note 42, at 19–21. 
 64. See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo:  The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to Clients, 
40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909, 919–20 (2009). 
 65. Id. at 920, 923, 928–29. 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. e (2000). 
 67. See Eleanor W. Myers, Examining Independence and Loyalty, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 857, 
861 (1999) (suggesting that concern about independence from third parties “is primarily a 
concern about impairing client loyalty”). 
 68. See Carson, supra note 41, at 611–13 (“A non-lawyer partner’s primary concern is 
likely to be a good return on his investment.”); Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of 
the Professional World:  They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the 
2014] WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CONTROL 2951 
that nonlawyer owners will accidentally or purposefully cause their own 
law firms to be conflicted out of cases due to their other nonlegal business 
activities, thus depriving clients of representation.69  Finally, critics have 
expressed the concern that nonlawyer investors would influence the 
substantive advice that lawyers provide their clients based on various 
business and political interests that may be affected by the client’s cases.70 
These objections have been met by persuasive rebuttals that point out that 
while agents of lawyers might act in ways that are self-dealing, owners of 
law firms are incentivized to act in ways that maximize the law firm’s long-
term value.71  But these rebuttals have force in inverse proportion to the 
type of nonlawyer control under discussion.  Where the fear is that the 
nonlawyer will spend less money on a client, or retain the “wrong” clients, 
it is easy to see why some version of the efficient market hypothesis could 
meet this fear.  The efficient market hypothesis has some empirical support 
from the experience of bank lending to law firms.  As noted above, the line 
between a loan and equity is so difficult to draw because of what was 
termed “clever” drafting—that is, because a loan covenant can be drafted to 
provide the lender with (in theory) a great deal of control over the future 
actions of the borrower.72  For this reason, bank loans to law firms of this 
nature are analogous to law firm equity ownership.  While it is difficult to 
gather much empirical data due to the confidential nature of the loan 
agreements, the relationship between banks and law firms is not completely 
opaque.  We know, for example, that since the financial crisis of 2008, 
banks have begun to exercise increasing control over law firms by setting 
out detailed constraints in advance.73  What is interesting is what the banks 
 
Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (2000) (arguing that Rule 5.4 guards against 
“interference by nonlaw trained masters who wish us to take short cuts to maximize 
profits”). 
 69. See Carson, supra note 41, at 619 (“Conflicts of interest could even be used to the 
non-lawyer partner’s advantage.  A virtually unlimited ability to invest would provide 
corporate and some individual non-lawyer partners with a powerful means to control the 
market for legal services.  For example, a corporation could control consumer and 
competitor access to legal counsel by maintaining a partnership interest in each of the best 
law firms in a particular city.”). 
 70. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
American Legal Profession:  A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal 
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 138 (2000) (discussing the 
possibility that real estate investors in law firms could control advice to clients—or worse, 
the manner that legal service is delivered to clients—in ways that systematically benefit the 
real estate industry and harm the client). See generally Fox, supra note 68 (applying the 
same argument to accountants as investors). 
 71. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 42, at 39; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 70, 
at 139; Ribstein, supra note 34, at 1173–74; Cox, supra note 45, at 528. 
 72. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 774. 
 73. See Cox, supra note 45, at 524 (“[T]wo main lenders to firms—units of Citigroup 
Inc. and the bank formerly known as Wachovia—have started attaching more stringent terms 
to loans, further eroding the desirability of debt.  Firms seeking to extend credit lines must 
now comply with detailed disclosures, and institute a litany of changes demanded by lenders 
who have been burned by law firms now in default.  Citigroup, for instance, now insists that 
indebted law firms ‘plac[e] strict internal controls on discretionary spending, cut[] bonuses, 
freez[e] associate salaries, postpon[e] new hires or initiatives, lay[] off professional and 
administrative staff, and revamp[] partner compensation schedules to slow distributions and 
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seem not to do.  Banks do not, it seems, tell lawyers whether to spend x 
dollars on Case A or to tell Client C that a settlement offer of y dollars is 
reasonable and that in the lawyer’s professional opinion, the client should 
accept it.  It seems that lenders have not been inclined to demand this level 
of control, or (and this amounts to the same thing) it has not been attractive 
to lawyers to grant this level of control in exchange for capital.74 
The critics might concede all or some of the previous arguments but 
retreat to the position that even when nonlawyer investors subjectively 
attempt to promote the legal ends of the clients of law firms, clients will 
always do worse than if the lawyers with whom they worked did not share 
ownership of the lawyer’s practice.  This assumes that nonlawyers are either 
subject to unconscious bias and that lawyers conform their behavior to these 
biases in ways that harm clients or that nonlawyers consciously try to 
promote the legal ends of clients, and their well-intentioned efforts harm 
clients.  And, if either (or both) of these propositions were true, then the 
client could still be harmed even if the lawyer were loyal, for the lawyer 
herself is not being asked to do something that is on its face disloyal to the 
client; the lawyer now faces the problem of what to do with a nonlawyer 
whose desire to promote the client’s ends is sincere, but misguided.  While 
one could describe this as a problem of loyalty for the lawyer (the lawyer 
has a duty to tell the client that the ends sought by the nonlawyer are well 
intentioned but wrong), this is really more a problem of different 
professional values.  The problem for the lawyer, if she were frank with her 
client, is not that the nonlawyer investor is asking the lawyer to be disloyal 
to the client, but that the nonlawyer investor is asking the lawyer to act in 
violation of her professional “core values,” which may understandably be 
different from those sincerely held by the nonlawyer.75 
 
improve cash positions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Susan A. Berson, Loans and 
Moans:  Past Firm Failures Mean Tougher Credit Rules, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 30, 30)). 
 74. This is not to deny that litigation investment creates incentives for lawyers’s self-
dealing at the expense of the client.  I discuss what I term the “Self-Dealing Problem” in 
litigation investment in another context. See Anthony J. Sebok, Litigation Investment and 
Legal Ethics:  What Are the Real Issues?, 55 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2014).  A 
decision by a funder to advance $1 million or $2 million for legal expenses means $1 million 
or $2 million dollars for the attorney(s) who will now have more income.  It would be naïve 
to act as if the interests of a claimholder and her attorney are always in alignment when the 
question arises whether litigation should begin or be continued.  But it would be equally 
naïve to think that there is anything new about this potential ethical conflict.  It exists all the 
time—it is an inescapable feature of the fact that law is a business.  The “Self-Dealing 
Problem” is a problem, but not one limited to litigation investment. 
 75. The “core values” debate in the legal ethics literature has produced a large literature 
in itself.  In the context of the debate over amending Rule 5.4(a), the literature has played a 
crucial role. See Schneyer, supra note 59, at 130–31 (“For many lawyers, the profession’s 
core values are the heart of lawyer professionalism.  Consequently, many of the comments 
opposing the [ABA Ethics 20/20] Working Group’s proposal expressed concerns that, by 
allowing even a very limited form of nonlawyer ownership, the proposal would compromise 
core values.”). 
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2.  Legal Advice Uninfluenced by Nonlegal Values 
One goal of Rule 5.4(a) is to ensure that the nonlawyer owner does not 
influence the lawyer.  But this goal has to be unpacked.  What does it mean 
to be “influenced” or “controlled” in this context?  Obviously, if a lawyer 
converses with a nonlawyer and, based on that conversation, comes to a 
conclusion about a legal issue, there is nothing illegitimate about that.  For 
example, a lawyer might, in conversation with a scientist, come to a 
conclusion about the chances of his client proving cause-in-fact in a tort suit 
and then advise the client to settle at a lower amount than she had 
previously recommended. 
In the example above, we can observe two things.  First, the lawyer was 
not compelled to draw the conclusion about causation she drew (although 
the scientist may have believed that the conclusion was “compelled” by the 
facts and “laws” of science).  Second, the issue was not one involving legal 
judgment; the nonlawyer influenced the lawyer’s judgment about a 
scientific fact, and the legal judgment came later, produced by the lawyer 
applying her legal skills and knowledge to the newly revised scientific 
judgment.  A final observation:  the process described above seems both 
normal and desirable.  By this I mean it is exactly what a client would want 
her lawyer to do.  In other words, loyalty to the client requires the lawyer to 
sometimes be influenced by a nonlawyer. 
For the argument that clients must have access to advice uninfluenced by 
nonlawyers to work, there must be a domain of advice unlike scientific 
advice that cannot be adequately generated if nonlawyers play a role in its 
formation.  It follows from the claim that the introduction of “nonlawyer 
reasons” into the formation of this domain of advice is detrimental to the 
client that the lawyer must control the formation of this domain of advice— 
hence the “right” of the lawyer to be free from nonlawyer control in this 
domain.  The foregoing is merely a theoretical expression of an intuition 
that clearly motivates the “core values” argument in legal ethics.76  If one 
accepts its premise—that lawyers think about their clients’ ends differently 
from nonlawyers—then its conclusion follows, which is that nonlawyers 
cannot be the final judge of whether their reasons should reach the client.  
And from this it follows that clients must be shielded from nonlawyers’ 
influence in the formation of legal advice even if they want it.77 
 
 76. Why lawyers have this intuition can be subjected to numerous types of analysis, 
some less charitable than others.  One of the best attempts at explaining the “core values” 
belief structure in its relation to Rule 5.4 is Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on 
Multidisciplinary Practice:  Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications 
for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1145–46 (2000) (describing the five 
premises upon which the “core values rationale” relies). 
 77. See id. (“Even if the legal services were rendered exclusively by lawyers in the 
multidisciplinary firm, these lawyers could not be counted on to serve skillfully and in 
accordance with the legal profession’s ethics rules . . . .  The clients should not be allowed to 
contract to accept service under a different set of norms from those governing the attorney-
client relationship, or even to assume the risk that the lawyers would violate their duties to 
their clients, because their clients would have to be self-destructive or misguided to do so.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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C.  Why Can’t a Client Order Her Lawyer To  
Accept the Legal Views of a Nonlawyer? 
One might ask why, if a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to her client, the 
client could not, in theory, order the lawyer to allow her legal reasoning to 
be influenced by a nonlawyer’s efforts at reasoning about legal questions.78  
The argument that the client cannot be allowed to do this, because the 
lawyer’s duty to the client is nonwaivable, is circular.  It has to be grounded 
in an argument.  If the argument is that a client cannot understand the 
consequences of giving such an order to her lawyer, it may make sense to 
ask whether this may be true for some clients but not others and some types 
of nonlawyers and not others.79 
Before these more nuanced questions are asked, however, a more general 
point should be made.  The question posed in this section might seem to be 
a red herring in the following way.  Perhaps Rule 5.4 should be amended to 
allow a client to order her lawyer’s legal reasoning to be influenced by a 
nonlawyer after the client has learned something about the case, or after it 
has progressed, so that the client’s choice is not only about a class of 
reasons but also contingent on the identity of the nonlawyer and the specific 
facts of a case to which that class of reasons will be applied.  But the 
problem of nonlawyer investment in law firms—especially as framed in this 
Article, where the investment comes from the capital markets—has nothing 
to do with the quaint hypothetical posed at the beginning of this section.  A 
client cannot possibly know in advance the identity of the nonlawyers who 
will affect her lawyer’s legal reasoning, or how they will do so, or when 
they will do so, if all she knows is that her lawyer is employed by a firm 
that is partly owned by shareholders, a private equity firm, or a consulting 
group. 
This objection is very serious.  Recall the arguments made earlier about 
the market pressures that will produce a hands-off approach in the work of 
the lawyers in firms owned by nonlawyers.  The question is not, “Can a 
client rationally choose to have her lawyer influenced in her day-to-day 
legal practice on the client’s behalf?”  That question is more relevant for 
certain models of alternative litigation funding.80  The question I want to 
pose here is, granting that there is some subtle effect on the legal practice of 
lawyers in a firm partly owned by nonlawyers that would potentially 
influence the reasons of lawyers working in that firm, is it rational for a 
client to seek to retain such a firm?  The answer, it seems to me, depends on 
the benefits that accrue to the client in exchange for allowing her lawyers to 
 
 78. In theory, a client could require her lawyer to confer with, and perhaps even to 
follow instructions from, a nonlawyer with regard to her case where the client has signed a 
contract directly with the nonlawyer.  This could happen in the case of litigation investment 
contracts. See Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers:  Too Many Cooks in 
the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791 (2012).  It most certainly happens 
when people who become clients sign insurance contracts, as I will explain in the next 
section. 
 79. See id. at 2829–30 (discussing the benefits of nonlawyer participation in litigation). 
 80. See generally Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 455 (2012). 
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be influenced by nonlawyers.  One such benefit, especially for plaintiffs 
seeking contingency fee representation, is that her lawyer will have 
sufficient capital to pursue her case to its completion.  The story of the 
Woburn litigation in A Civil Action is a sobering reminder of what happens 
when an attorney attempts to complete complex litigation with insufficient 
capital.81  Even if the advantage to clients is less dramatic, coming in the 
form of reduced hourly fees (and a well-insured, solvent lawyer to sue in 
the event of malpractice), the transaction may be worthwhile to the client. 
II.  WHEN CLIENTS CAN TRANSFER CONTROL TO NONLAWYERS:   
THE CASE OF INSURANCE LAW 
Another way to ask whether there is something so wrong about a client 
ordering her lawyer to accept the legal views of a nonlawyer, such that it 
should be treated as a nonwaivable part of the Model Rules, is to ask 
whether courts allow clients to do the same thing in other parts of the law.  
The answer is that we do—in the context of the everyday, “garden variety,” 
liability insurance contract. 
In almost every liability insurance contract, the insurer demands from the 
insured that it cede control of any litigation that may occur in the future 
where the insured is a defendant.  The insurer makes this demand a 
condition of coverage by the insurer.82  The courts that have permitted 
insureds to transfer control over litigation have done so without any 
illusions about what they were permitting.  The Missouri Supreme Court 
observed in In re Allstate Insurance Co.83 that under the typical third-party 
liability insurance contract 
 [t]he insurer has the contract right to direct the litigation against [the] 
insured.  It may evaluate claims and decide whether to settle . . . .  It may 
make economic decisions without the assent of the insured.  The insured 
may want a quick settlement to eliminate further demands on time and 
energy, but the insurer does not have to settle unless a satisfactory offer is 
forthcoming.  Or the insurer may accept a settlement offer even though 
the insured wants to go to trial to establish freedom from fault.  The 
insurer may decide what to spend in defense, what discovery is to be had, 
and what experts to hire.  It also has the right to select counsel to defend 
its interests.84 
 
 81. See Robert F. Blomquist, Bottomless Pit:  Toxic Trials, the American Legal 
Profession, and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 977 (1996) 
(reviewing JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995)). 
 82. Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the 
Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1594–95 (1994) (“[Standard general liability insurance 
contracts] grant[] the company plenary and exclusive control of the defense.  Ordinarily, the 
company can select counsel to defend the insured, discharge appointed counsel and name a 
replacement without the insured’s consent, bargain with appointed counsel over fees, 
monitor counsel and direct litigation strategy, require counsel to inform the company of 
settlement demands and procedural developments, direct counsel to initiate settlement 
discussions, settle claims without an insured’s consent and decline to settle claims over an 
insured’s objection, and file appeals.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 83. 722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). 
 84. Id. at 952. 
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There is a downside for the insured to exclusive insurance company 
control.85  This has been exemplified by several cases.86  In response to the 
risks summarized in In re Allstate Insurance Co., courts developed various 
doctrines to protect the insured from the reality that all the incentives 
pointed towards the insurer sacrificing the insured’s interests after litigation 
has begun.  The most significant of these is the duty to settle in good faith.87 
The duty of good faith is implied by the law’s “covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing,” which is imputed into insurance policies.88  The duty is 
breached if the insurer’s conduct during the insured’s litigation damages 
“the very protection or security which the insured sought to gain by buying 
insurance.”89  Although, in theory, the duty applies to any aspect of the 
insurer’s behavior that affects the interests of the insured, in practice courts 
are usually unwilling to find violations of the duty where insurers have 
settled within policy limits.90  Charles Silver and Kent Syverud call these 
“full coverage cases” and note that the disputes that arise from these cases 
have to do with objections by insureds over the noneconomic injuries they 
suffer resulting from the insurer’s decision to settle the lawsuit against the 
insured and pay the entire amount of the settlement.91  Full coverage cases 
are the best place to look to see what limits, if any, courts place on the 
transfer of control of litigation by insureds.  Where an insured (or some 
other party) is asking a court to set aside the contract terms that give the 
insurer control over the litigation in a full coverage case, the conflict is not 
over the settlement amount, but something else—either how to conduct the 
litigation or whether to settle at all.  The dispute is about control over legal 
judgment:  who has it, and whether the law can allow a nonlawyer to have 
final say over the implementation of that judgment, notwithstanding the 
views of the litigant or her own attorney. 
A cursory review of the case law shows that, in full coverage cases, 
common law courts uphold the insurance contract as written.  The clearest 
example of this comes from cases involving doctors who object to their 
insurer settling medical malpractice claims within policy limits.  Doctors 
resent being sued in medical malpractice and probably believe that 
 
 85. Silver, supra note 82, at 1597. 
 86. See, e.g., Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting 
that the insurance company’s appointed defense attorney took advantage of the insured by 
“actively working to protect [the insurance company] and persisting in manipulating [the 
insured] against her own best interests”); Rosenzweig v. Blinshteyn, 544 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 
(App. Div. 1989) (encountering a defense counsel appointed by the insurance carrier who 
adopted a defense to avoid the payment of any monies by the insurance company, regardless 
of the consequences to the insureds, who were his “ostensible clients”). 
 87. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Duty of Liability Insurer To Settle or Compromise, 40 
A.L.R.2D 168 (2009); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990). 
 88. See, e.g., Hall v. Svea Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 1102, 1104–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
 89. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 573 (Ariz. 1986).  The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing can be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century. 
See Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914). 
 90. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance 
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 263 (1995); Syverud, supra note 87, at 1159. 
 91. Silver & Syverud, supra note 90, at 263–64. 
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settlements injure their reputations.  Even if they can be confident that 
settlements will be sealed or protected from public access, doctors may still 
feel, with some reason, that they have a right to a public judgment by a 
court where allegations against them impugn their professional (and 
perhaps personal) character.92  The short answer to these insureds is:  
“Tough luck.”  As James Fischer puts it, “These individuals have, of 
course, an option.  They can defend at their own expense or they can 
bargain for ‘consent to settle’ provisions.”93  Subject to the rights gained if 
the insured purchases them back from the insurer, the standard liability 
insurance contract does not require an insurer to take into account the 
insured’s litigation preferences if it settles within policy limits.94 
An example of the scope of control allowed under the standard liability 
insurance contract can be seen in Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co.95  The insureds, a physician and his wife, were sued by 
another physician, their former business partner, on various civil claims 
including defamation and intentional interference with contractual 
relationships.96  The insured filed counterclaims.97  The insurer provided an 
attorney for all the claims but one, the intentional interference with 
contractual relationships, which the insureds defended on their own.98  Over 
the objections of the insureds, the insurer concluded a global settlement 
with the former partner, and all claims, including the intentional 
interference with contractual relationships and the counterclaims, were 
dismissed.99  The insureds sued the insurer, claiming that the insurer 
secured a settlement that was favorable to the insurer and not favorable to 
 
 92. See 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 10.06 
(2014) (discussing physicians’ resistance to settlement).  Of course, doctors are not alone in 
feeling this way.  Drivers may also feel this to some degree as well, and resent when their 
insurance company settles what they believe is a frivolous whiplash claim instead of 
resisting the groundless claim until it is dropped or defeated in court: 
  The policyholder wishes to contest liability, perhaps to avoid the stigma of 
responsibility or the economic consequences of a finding of fault.  A defense 
limited to the issue of damages may be perceived by the policyholder as an 
acknowledgment of legal responsibility.  For some individuals such an admission 
may be difficult to make even in the face of clear evidence of fault.  Some 
individuals can live with the vagaries of life.  They will accept the decision to 
focus the litigation on minimizing the loss even though it means admitting, or 
being understood as admitting, responsibility for conduct they do not actually 
believe was legally wrongful.  Other individuals will find such conduct morally 
and emotionally repugnant. 
James M. Fischer, Insurer-Policyholder Interests, Defense Counsel’s Professional Duties, 
and the Allocation of Power To Control the Defense, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 40 (2008). 
 93. Id.  A “consent to settle” provision gives the insured control over whether to settle, 
but not the conduct of the litigation in other regards. Syverud, supra note 87, at 1175–76. 
 94. Syverud, supra note 87, at 1159; see Webb v. Witt, 876 A.2d 858, 867 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (holding that the absence of a consent to settle clause is not against 
public policy; “[p]resumably, the premium paid to the insurer reflects the presence or 
absence of a consent to settle clause”). 
 95. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 96. Id. at 705–06. 
 97. Id. at 706. 
 98. Id. at 706–07. 
 99. Id. at 707. 
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the insureds and it coerced the insureds into accepting the settlement by 
refusing to pay invoices of their independent defense counsel.100  The 
settlement allegedly impaired the insureds’ negotiating position; caused 
injury to their reputation; precluded them from filing a malicious 
prosecution action against their former partner; provided funds to the 
former partner to use to finance his defense of future lawsuits brought by 
the insureds; deprived the insureds of insurance financing for their future 
litigation against the former partner; and impacted the insureds’ future 
insurability.101  The court upheld the dismissal of the insureds’ suit.102  The 
court conceded that, by settling the claim, the insurer exposed the insureds 
to costs, including unwanted media attention and the loss of potentially 
valid counterclaims.103  But, the court also noted: 
 These are the ordinary consequences of settlement. . . .  Liability 
insurance exists primarily to protect the insured’s finances.  The covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to minimize the 
possibility of an award that exceeds the policy’s limits—it does not 
require the insurer to fight a legal action until the bitter end when the 
costs of defense exceed the benefit to be achieved.104 
The court noted that the insureds’ complaint “[put] a reverse spin” on bad 
faith doctrine:  instead of arguing that the insurer acted in bad faith when it 
unreasonably refused to settle a case within policy limits, they were arguing 
that the insurer engaged in bad faith conduct when it accepted a settlement 
over the insureds’ objection even though there was no risk to the insureds of 
an excess judgment.105  The insured’s desire to control the litigation, while 
understandable, is something they gave away when they bought insurance.  
The protection the law provides them in the wake of that decision—the 
doctrine of good faith—does not require the insurer to take into account 
“the entire range of the insured’s well-being,” but just one thing:  the 
monetary judgment at risk in the claim against the insured.106 
 
 100. Id. at 708. 
 101. Id. at 706–08. 
 102. Id. at 708–09. 
 103. Id. at 712 (“The decision to settle rather than continue litigation invariably involves a 
conflict between the desire to vindicate oneself and the desire to minimize the costs of 
litigation and avoid the risk of loss.  Defendants who settle face an uphill battle in 
convincing others, including members of the interested public or the media, that they were 
completely innocent of the charges.  Moreover, when a defendant pays money or gives up 
something of value to settle a claim, he or she loses the ability to later pursue a malicious 
prosecution claim.”). 
 104. Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 713 (citing W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78 
(Ct. App. 1995)). 
 106. Id. at 711–12; see, e.g., Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. 
Ins. Trust, 591 So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992); Jon Epstein, Annotation, Liability of Insurer to 
Insured for Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in Detriment to 
Insured, 18 A.L.R.5TH 474 (1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the reform of the prohibition on fee splitting 
should begin by analyzing why nonlawyers want control.  The reason for 
this starting point is threefold.  First, the fear that nonlawyers will use 
control to self-deal in a disloyal fashion, while legitimate in some contexts, 
may be pure fiction in others.  Second, the fear that nonlawyers will use 
control to influence the reasons that clients receive concerning legal 
decisionmaking, while genuine, needs to be balanced against client 
autonomy:  loyalty to clients may require lawyers (and nonlawyers) to 
allow clients to hear opinions from whomever the client chooses.  Third, 
and finally, client autonomy to involve nonlawyers in legal decisionmaking 
is not an aspiration or a theoretical possibility.  This concept is quite real 
and is defended vigorously by the courts in the context of third-party 
liability insurance contracts.  It is not clear why similar autonomy should 
not be encouraged with equal vigor in the context of third-party nonlawyer 
investment in law firms where there is a demand by clients for lawyers who 
are employed by firms owned in part by nonlawyers. 
 
